Recent progress on pairing implementation has made certain pairings extremely simple and fast to compute. Hence, it is natural to examine if there are consequences for the security of pairing-based cryptography.
Introduction
The use of pairings as a component of protocols is a major topic in public key cryptography (see, for example, [4] ). The security of cryptosystems based on pairings depends on the difficulty of various new computational problems.
One of the most fundamental computational problems in this area is the pairing inversion problem (see Section 2.1 for a statement of this problem). In comparison with existing problems in cryptography (such as the integer factorisation and discrete logarithm problems), it has received little scrutiny. However, results of Verheul [21, 22] and Satoh [18, 19] provide evidence that this problem is hard.
Recent progress on pairing implementation has made some pairings extremely simple and fast to compute. Hence, it seems appropriate to re-evaluate the security of pairing based cryptography in light of such progress.
We show that, for some very specific supersingular elliptic curves, the final exponentiation in the pairing computation is either not required or can be replaced by one squaring. This makes pairing computation very simple on these curves and it is natural to wonder if the pairing inversion problem is easier on them. The fact that the final exponentiation can sometimes be avoided may also have implications for side-channel analysis of pairing implementations (see [17] ).
We propose and analyse a multivariate attack on the pairing inversion problem. Our findings further support the belief that pairing inversion is a hard computational problem for elliptic curves.
The paper is outlined as follows. In Section 2 we recall some known facts about pairings and the pairing inversion problem. Section 3 details how to compute eta pairings with a greatly simplified final exponentiation. The remaining section discusses and analyses a multivariate attack on the pairing inversion problem.
Pairings
Let E be a supersingular elliptic curve over a finite field F q . We denote the point at infinity by 0. For any n ∈ N we denote by E(F q n ) the group of points on E defined over F q n . Suppose r is a (large) prime, coprime to q, which divides #E(F q ). Let k be the smallest positive integer such that r | (q k − 1). Since E is supersingular we know that k ≤ 6. We assume k > 1. We define µ r = {z ∈ F * q k : z r = 1} and define E(F q n )[r] = {P ∈ E(F q n ) : [r]P = 0}.
For cryptographic applications using supersingular curves (see [4, 6] for surveys) it is common to restrict attention to pairings on the cyclic group of points of order r defined over the ground field F q . Hence, we consider a non-degenerate bilinear pairing of the form
We may obtain such a pairing from the Weil pairing [20] or Tate pairing [9] twisted by an endomorphism ψ called a distortion map [21, 22] .
For example, if the Tate pairing is used then we define e(P, Q) = f r,P (ψ(Q)) (q k −1)/r where f r,P is a function on E with divisor (f r,P ) = r(P ) − r(0) (see [4] or [6] for more details about pairings). The value f r,P (ψ(Q)) may be computed using Miller's algorithm [16] .
Inverting pairings
The following computational problem arises naturally from the consideration of pairing-based cryptosystems. Joux [13] calls this the fixed Tate inversion (FTI) problem.
Pairing inversion problem 1: Suppose E is a supersingular elliptic curve with a pair-
such that e(P, Q) = z.
Clearly, if one can solve the discrete logarithm problem in µ r then one can solve the pairing inversion problem: choose a random point Q ∈ E(F q )[r], compute z = e(P, Q ), solve the DLP z = (z ) λ and then return Q = [λ]Q . For more information about the relation between pairing inversion and other computational problems see Joux [13] .
The pairing inversion problem (in the case of cyclic groups) is essentially to compute a specific group homomorphism from µ r to E(F q )[r]. Hence it is also natural to consider the more general problem of computing homomorphisms between finite fields and cyclic subgroups of elliptic curves. Verheul [21, 22] considered the problem of computing a group homomorphism from µ r to E(F q ) [r] . He showed a number of striking consequences of being able to compute such a homomorphism. We state a variant of his main result below.
Theorem 2.1. (Verheul [21] ) Let E be an elliptic curve with a pairing e as above,
be a non-trivial group homomorphism and suppose one has an algorithm which computes φ in polynomial time. Then the computational Diffie-Hellman problem in µ r and the computational Diffie-Hellman problem in E(F q )[r] may be solved in polynomial time.
In other words, we have CDH µr ≤ P pairing inversion ≤ P DLP µr (where ≤ P denotes polynomial time reduction). Since the Diffie-Hellman problem has been proven to be equivalent to the discrete logarithm problem in many cases [15] , Verheul's results suggest that computing such a group homomorphism is hard. These results can be interpreted as evidence that inverting pairings is a hard problem.
Satoh [18, 19] has given further evidence that computing such a homomorphism is hard. He showed that if the group homomorphism is represented as a polynomial then, in many cases, the polynomial has large degree and all coefficients are non-zero.
We stress that Verheul's results are not about inverting a specific pairing. Indeed, if there exists one pairing on E for which the pairing inversion problem is easy, then it follows that the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is easy on E and hence E is not suitable for pairing-based cryptography. As a result, the problem of interest is slightly different from the pairing inversion problem as given above. We therefore restate the problem.
Pairing inversion problem 2: Suppose E is a supersingular curve with a pairing e as above. Find a non-degenerate bilinear map
The starting point of this paper is the observation that there exist pairings on some supersingular elliptic curves E which are extremely simple to compute. It is a natural problem to try to invert these pairings. If a pairing inversion algorithm were found for these pairings then the particular supersingular curves would be immediately insecure for all discrete logarithm based cryptography (either using pairings or not).
The final exponentiation as a security feature
When computing the Tate pairing in the usual way it is necessary to compute the value of a function f r,P (Q) and then to perform a 'final exponentiation' to the power of (q k − 1)/r to obtain a unique and well-defined value. This final exponentiation seems to have a positive contribution to the security of the resulting system as it destroys information. More precisely, given a pairing value z ∈ µ r it is not at all clear what the actual output value of Miller's algorithm is. This issue was also noted in [17] .
If the final exponentiation can be avoided then it is natural to have concerns about the security of the pairing. One way to avoid the final exponentiation with Tate pairings is to replace r by q k − 1. It is known (see Theorem IX.9(1) of [4] ) that the Tate pairing of P and ψ(Q) is equal to
(if the leading coefficient of f q k −1,P at infinity is 1) which does not require a final exponentiation. However, this variant requires a much longer loop in Miller's algorithm.
As this pairing takes longer to compute, one may have fewer concerns that it could be weak.
The Weil pairing can also be computed without a final exponentiation. However, the Weil pairing is much more complicated to compute, as it requires roughly two Tate pairing computations, and the roles of P and Q change during the calculation. The multivariate methods we propose later in the paper do not seem to readily extend to the case of the Weil pairing.
Computing eta pairings with a simple final exponentiation
In this section, we present a method to compute a non-degenerate pairing on certain supersingular curves in such a way that the final exponentiation is at most a squaring. The pairing computation is therefore much simplified, as very few algebraic operations are required. One might expect this approach to be more efficient than previous methods for computing pairings, but this is not the case. Hence we stress that the purpose of this section is not to propose an efficient algorithm for pairing implementation.
The eta pairing [3] is a generalisation of the Duursma-Lee [8] method for computing pairings. It greatly simplifies pairing computation for supersingular curves over fields of small characteristic with even embedding degree. There are two variants of the eta pairing, namely the basic version (which is equivalent to the Duursma-Lee method) and the truncated version which has better performance. Our methods seem to only apply to the basic version. Section 3.1 presents some details of the eta pairing. In Section 3.2 we give the idea of the method to avoid the final exponentiation. Then we give some examples of curves which satisfy the requirements in order to be computed in this way.
The eta pairing
We recall the setting of [3] . Though elliptic curves are the main topic of this paper, we give the details in the more general setting of hyperelliptic curves. Let C be a supersingular hyperelliptic curve over F q (typically q = 2 or q = 3 for elliptic curves) with a single point 0 at infinity. Suppose the embedding degree k = 2d is even. Suppose m is coprime to k and that the divisor class group of C over F q m has a large prime factor r. We assume that there is an endomorphism γ such that if D is a degree zero divisor on C defined over F q km , and if ≡ denotes equivalence in the divisor class group, then
. For any α ∈ F q km we write α = α q md . We extend this notation to points and divisors by (α, β) = (α, β).
Suppose there is a distortion map (i.e., a non-
2) It follows that ψ maps divisor classes defined over F q m to divisor classes over F q mk which are in the trace zero subgroup.
Let D and D be divisors of degree zero on C over F q m and suppose We recall Theorem 1 of [3] (see [12] or [14] for an alternative proof). For examples of curves C satisfying the required conditions see [3, 8] .
Theorem 3.1. Let C be a supersingular curve satisfying the conditions above (in particular (3.1) and (3.2)). Let D and D = E − n(0) be degree zero divisors over F q m as above. Let N be the order of the divisor class group of C over F q m , so that the divisor classes of D and D have order dividing N . Let M = (q mk − 1)/N and T = q m . Suppose there are integers a and L such that T a + 1 = LN . Then
The above result shows that the eta pairing is non-degenerate when M, a, T and L are co-prime to N . In [3] the truncated eta pairing for elliptic curves is also presented, which is the case T = q m − N .
As in [3, 10] one can replace N in the above Theorem by a suitable multiple of N . Hence we usually take N = q md + 1 and thus M = q md − 1 and L = 1.
For the remainder of the paper we consider the elliptic case (or the case of degenerate divisors on higher genus curves) where D = (P ) − (0) and D = (Q) − (0).
Let g P (x, y) be a function defined over F q with divisor (g P ) = q(P ) + (−[q]P ) − (q + 1)(0) and let v P (x, y) be a function defined over F q with divisor (v P ) = (P ) + (−P ) − 2(0). Note that v P depends on x only. The eta pairing can be computed as
which is usually then raised to the power q md − 1. Further efficiency savings are obtained in practice by absorbing the powering to q m−1−i into the equations.
The eta pairing without a final exponentiation
In [3] , since a final exponentiation to the power q md − 1 is performed, it is noted that the denominators in equation (3.3) need not be computed. In this section we will explain that the final exponentiation may be avoided if one retains the denominators. The following is one of the main observations. Lemma 3.2. If g P and v P are as above then
This is equal to the divisor of v P (x, y) q v [q]P (x, y). Hence the result follows.
Indeed, if the functions g P and v P are normalised appropriately then we can arrange that the constant is 1. Hence, we will assume that g P (x, y)g P (−(x, y))) = v P (x, y) q v [q]P (x, y).
(3.4)
We now state our main result.
Theorem 3.3. Let the notation be as above and assume that equations (3.2) and (3.4) hold.
5)
Write z = η(P, Q). Then zz = 1.
Proof. Since g P (x, y) and v P (x, y) are defined over F q we have
Equations (3.2) and (3.4) imply that this product simplifies to
We can set j = i + 1 and note that the above product is
By equation (3.5) it follows that zz = 1. Proof. Theorem 3.3 shows that z has order dividing q md + 1. The final exponentiation would be to the power q md − 1 and so
Since gcd(q md + 1, q md − 1) | 2 and equals 2 if and only if q is odd, it follows that one can obtain a well-defined bilinear pairing without a final exponentiation if q is even. If q is odd then a squaring is required.
Granger et al [11] give a more general derivation of these results in the case of the ate pairing. With their approach the final exponentiation is never required, even if q is odd.
The characteristic two case
We illustrate the above ideas in the case of supersingular elliptic curves in characteristic 2. The curve E : y 2 + y = x 3 + x + b (where b = 0 or 1) over F 2 m , where m is odd, has embedding degree 4 (for more details see [3] ). In the notation of the previous subsection we put q = 2. Let P, Q ∈ E(F 2 m ) be points of order r and let ψ be the usual distortion map ψ(x, y) = (x + s 2 , y + sx + t) where s ∈ F 2 2 satisfies s 2 + s + 1 = 0 and t ∈ F 2 4 satisfies t 2 + t + s = 0.
We use the standard eta pairing notation from [3] . In particular, we use the notation a (i) for a 2 i . We have s (i) = s + i and t (i) = t + is + τ (i) where τ (i) = 0 if i ≡ 0, 1 (mod 4) and τ (i) = 1 if i ≡ 2, 3 (mod 4). Recall that if P = (x P , y P ), then
Hence equation (3.2) is satisfied.
We denote by l P (x, y) = y − λ(x − x P ) − y P (where λ = x 2 P + 1) the equation of the tangent to the curve at P (used in the formula for doubling P ) and v P (x) = x − x P the vertical line through P . Lemma 3.5. We have l P (x, y)l P (−(x, y)) = v P (x, y) 2 v [2]P (x, y).
Proof. Note that l P (−(x, y)) = l P (x, y + 1) = l P (x, y) + 1.
As noted before, the functions agree up to a constant c. To show that c = 1 we compute l P (x, y)(l P (x, y) + 1) = (y − λx + (λx P − y P ))(y − λx + (λx P − y P ) + 1)
Since the coefficients of x 3 are 1 in both cases it follows that l P (x, y)(l P (x, y)+1)
Hence, Theorem 3.3 and Corollary 3.4 imply that the eta pairing may be computed by including the vertical lines and excluding the final exponentiation. From a performance point of view there is no saving: the final exponentiation is just a division and we have replaced this by having denominators in the algorithm (which has also added a large number of extra multiplications). We now give some implementation details for future reference.
Lemma 3.6. Let notation be as above (in particular, m is odd). Then
It will be convenient in the security analysis to substitute j = m − 1 − i in the above, so that we move forwards through the powers of x Q . This leads to Algorithm 1 for computing the pairing. 
5:
x P ← x P , y P ← y P .
6:
x P ← x P , y P ← y P . 7 :
8:
x Q ← x 2 Q , y Q ← y 2 Q . 9: end for 10: return f 1 /f 2 We remark that it does not seem to be possible to simultaneously utilise the loop shortening idea (truncated eta pairing) and avoid the final exponentiation. In this case, let T = 2 (m+1)/2 ± 1. Then the pairing is computed as
where the final l and v [T ]P come from adding [2 (m+1)/2 ]P and ±P . Again, one can consider zz and much of the proof of Theorem 3.3 applies. The problem is that after canceling terms we get
and this is not equal to 1.
The Duursma-Lee curves
We now consider the supersingular curves 3 (mod 4) . These curves have genus g = (p − 1)/2 and are supersingular with embedding degree k = 2p. This family includes the case of elliptic curves over F 3 with embedding degree 6. A distortion map for these curves is
where σ ∈ F p 2 satisfies σ 2 = −1 and ρ ∈ F p p satisfies ρ p − ρ + 2b = 0. For x ∈ F p 2mp we define x = x p mp . It is clear that if Q ∈ C(F p m ) then ψ(Q) = −ψ(Q) and so equation (3.2) is satisfied. There are integers m such that #Jac(C)(F p m ) has a large prime factor, and so these groups have been proposed for pairing-based cryptography.
Duursma and Lee [8] showed how to compute pairings on these curves extremely efficiently and, for genus g ≥ 2, the eta and ate pairing methods do not substantially improve on their results. We require the following result from [8] .
Lemma 3.7. (Duursma and Lee [8] ) Let C be as above and let P = (x P , y P ) ∈ C(F p m ). Define [p]P = (x p 2 P + 2b, −y p 2 P ). Then p((P ) − (0)) ≡ ([p]P ) − (0) and
has divisor (g P ) = p(P ) + (−[p]P ) − (p + 1)(0).
We now show that the results of Section 3.2 can be applied. We have to check equations (3.2), (3.4) and (3.5) . We have already checked equation (3.2). The following lemma checks (3.4) . Note that v P (x, y) = (x − x P ). Lemma 3.8. Let P, Q ∈ C(F p m ). We have g P (ψ(Q))g P (ψ(Q)) = v P (ψ(Q)) p v [p]P (ψ(Q)).
Proof. Since g P is defined over F p m we have g P (ψ(Q)) = g P (ψ(Q)) = g P (−ψ(Q)). Hence, we consider the function g P (x, y) = g P (x, −y).
As in Lemma 3.2 it follows that
There are field elements a and c such that
As the coefficients of x p+1 are 1 in both cases it follows that g P (x, y)g P (x, y) = v p P v [p]P and the result is proven.
It remains to check equation (3.5) .
Hence, by Theorem 3.3 it follows that f p m ,P (ψ(Q)) already has norm 1 so only a single squaring is required to obtain a well-defined value. As before, it does not seem possible to avoid the final exponentiation when using the truncated eta pairing.
Note that the above results extend trivially to the eta pairing of divisors of the form D = P ∈C(F p m ) n P (P ). For the general case see [11] .
Multivariate attack on pairing inversion
Given the simple nature of the above pairing computation on supersingular curves, in particular the fact that the final exponentiation can essentially be avoided, it seems natural to reduce the pairing inversion problem to a problem of solving a system of multivariate equations.
We give the details in the case of characteristic 2 where the final exponentiation is not required. In the odd characteristic case one can run an analogous attack on each of the two square roots of the pairing value in turn.
Indeed, due to the simple nature of Algorithm 1 and the fact that squaring is linear in characteristic 2, one can reduce the pairing inversion problem to solving a system of polynomials of degree m. Since m is polynomial in the input size, this approach seems at first to be attractive.
We consider the pairing computation given in Section 3.3, which computes the pairing as a product of the form
. The attack assumes that x P and y P are fixed and that a target value z is specified. The goal is to find values for x Q and y Q . Since x P and y P are fixed, the equations of the lines l j and v j are known.
We write the unknown x Q over some basis for F 2 m /F 2 as x 0 θ 0 + x 1 θ 1 + · · · + x m−1 θ m−1 where all the x i are unknowns whose values will lie in F 2 . Similarly write y Q = m−1 i=0 y i θ i . Since we are working in characteristic two, x 2 Q can be expressed in terms of the variables x i (and similarly for y 2 Q etc) by applying a fixed linear transformation. Hence the l j (ψ(Q (j) )) and v j (ψ(Q (j) )) above are linear polynomials in the unknowns x i and y i .
We expand equation (4.1) as
and equate coefficients of θ i to get a system of polynomial equations over F 2 . More precisely, each of the l j and v j is a linear polynomial over F 2 4m in the 2m variables x i , y i (in fact, only x i variables appear in the v j terms). Equating coefficients over F 2 gives a system of 4m non-linear polynomials of degree m in 2m variables. One can compute this system of polynomials using an algorithm very similar to Algorithm 1 above.
The attack is therefore to solve this system of polynomial equations using Gröbner basis or linearisation techniques (see [2, 7] for surveys). One forms the ideal generated by the 4m polynomials above together with the field equations x 2 i − x i = y 2 i − y i = 0 and the system of m equations of degree 3 in the 2m variables coming from the elliptic curve equation. The field equations are very useful for keeping the degrees low, and it is prudent to take advantage of these relations during the computation of the polynomials in equation (4.2) .
This attack can also be performed in the odd characteristic case, exploiting the fact that p-powers are linear. In this setting the values of m are typically smaller than in the characteristic two case. Proof. We consider only the system of 4m polynomials of degree m in 2m variables coming from equation (4.2). Since we are using the field equations x p i − x i = 0 we can assume that all monomials are of the form m−1 i=0 x ei i y fi i where e i , f i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}. The number of such monomials is therefore at most p 2m . Since there are 4m polynomials in total then there are at most 4mp 2m monomials in total. Since we expect only about 1/p of them to have zero coefficients it follows that the expected storage is at least p−1 p mp 2m . The storage requirements for the system of polynomials coming from the curve equation and the field equations is lower. The result follows.
Since the description of the problem is growing exponentially in m one does not expect an efficient solution to the pairing inversion problem in this case. Indeed, for Table 2 . Behaviour of mp 2m as p grows values of cryptographic interest, m is chosen so that one cannot perform p m/2 computational operations. Hence it is clear that one cannot represent an ideal defined by polynomials of size p 2m .
To give a better idea of how the method performs in practice, we have implemented it in Magma [5] . A summary of the experimental results is given in Table 1 . The memory and time are given for the full attack, comprising of both calculating the system of polynomial equations and solving the system using Gröbner basis reduction. In our practical experiments (on an ordinary laptop with 1Gb RAM) the bottleneck was the computation and storage of the polynomials, rather than the computation of the Gröbner basis. For m = 9 the available memory was exceeded during the construction of the polynomials. It is very likely that the implementation of the attack can be improved, but one cannot avoid the exponential growth of the size of the polynomials under consideration.
It is interesting to consider this attack as the genus grows. For example, consider the Duursma-Lee genus 3 curve over F 7 m with embedding degree 14. It seems to be sufficient to take m ≈ 26 to avoid the standard attacks. This is a big difference from the previous values m ≈ 170. Of course, the memory requirement is proportional to 7 2m ≈ 2 151 and so our attack is still infeasible. However, if we consider larger primes, then the attack could conceivably become practical. Table 2 gives an idea of how the size of the ideal changes. The values m are chosen so that p mg > 2 160 and p 2mp > 2 1024 .
Due to index calculus algorithms [1] , one knows that the discrete logarithm problem has a subexponential solution for fixed size q as the genus grows, so curves of genus g > 4 are not used in cryptography. Also, in the higher genus case then pairings are typically defined on divisors rather than points. Nevertheless, it is a very interesting problem to consider whether one can invert pairings on high genus curves efficiently.
If it were possible to compute the truncated eta pairing without needing a final exponentiation, then we would require only 2(m + 1)/2 = m + 1 variables and would obtain a system of 4m equations of degree (m + 1)/2. This is a considerably simpler system, but it still has exponential size.
We conclude that the multivariate attack on pairing inversion is not feasible for elliptic curves. However, we note that any further progress in loop shortening could potentially jeopardise security.
If m is not prime then one variant of the method would be to have the variables x i take values in some extension field F p u where u | m. This would reduce the number of variables, but the degree of the equations would increase (due to the increase in the degree of the field equations) and the p-power map would no longer be linear. Indeed, having 2m/u variables with each appearing to degree up to p u (and each coefficient being stored as a u-tuple over F p ) requires storage proportional to u(m/u)(p u ) 2m/u = mp 2m which is exactly the same as before. Hence there seems to be no advantage from this approach.
Conclusion
We have presented a method to compute the eta pairing for which the final exponentiation is at most a squaring. A more general method has subsequently been proposed in [11] .
We have considered a multivariate attack on the pairing inversion problem which does not appear to lead to any practical attack on the system in the elliptic case. This adds weight to the belief that pairing inversion is a hard problem for elliptic curves.
A more general pairing inversion problem is: given z find points P and Q such that e(P, Q) = z. Our results do not shed any light on this problem.
The central computational problem in pairing based cryptography is the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem. Our results do not concern this problem, and further research on it is required.
